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Abstract
We study the formation of public opinion in a poll process where the current score is open
to public. The voters are assumed to vote probabilistically for or against their own preference
considering the group opinion collected up to then in the score. The poll-score probability is found
to follow the beta distribution in the large polls limit. We demonstrate that various poll results
even contradictory to the population preference are possible with non-zero probability density and
that such deviations are readily triggered by initial bias. It is mentioned that our poll model can
be understood in the Bayesian viewpoint.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Public opinion is a collective attitude of individuals on social or political issues, and
its formation is governed by the interactions among individuals and the influence of mass
media [1, 2]. As some characteristics to reach consensus are regarded to have an analogy with
the magnetization of spin alignment, the spin systems have been providing the research tool
in studying the public opinion formation [3–10]. Also, the heterogeneity of the interaction
structure was found to play a significant role as the interaction networks with hubs of many
connections show the distinctive opinion formation not observed in the earlier works [11, 12].
Recently, an empirical study is also performed to examine the opinion dynamics with the
real data available in the social media [13].
In the public opinion formation, the most interactions are considered local except for a
few exceptions like that of hub node, for example, because of the practical restrictions of the
physical entity interaction. Recently, the restriction is however reduced a lot in the progress
of communication technology. The vast amount of information by anonymous agents is
spread across the world instantly through various media and readily influences individuals.
Furthermore, opinions on a specific issue are easily gathered, publicized, and again affects
the opinion of the other individuals who might not have a firm opinion or belief. The
influenced opinion then propagates again and by itself also has an impact on the opinion of
others. Therefore, in the environment of a fast and wide range of communications, opinion
formation can be a consequence of a chain reaction triggered by pre-formed opinion, as
observed in information cascade [14]. This is as a matter of fact what happens in many
web-based opinion propagations on social/political issues, new products, and fake news [15].
In this paper, we investigate public opinions in a poll model, proposed focusing upon the
effect of prior opinion. In our model, the poll score is released every time a new vote comes
in, providing a prior opinion to the next voter. Voters are assumed to vote stochastically
for or against their own preferences with a probability that depends on the poll score at the
moment of voting and the self-assurance about the preference (or faith). The probability
distribution of the poll score is found to follow the beta distribution in the large polls limit.
It is demonstrated that various poll results even contradictory to the population preference
are possible with non-zero probability density and that such deviations are readily triggered
by initial bias. A Bayesian interpretation of our model is finally proposed.
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This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we propose a poll model where individual
stochastically votes for or against her/his preference considering the poll score, and then
solve it analytically in Sec. III. In Sec. IV, a few interesting properties of the solution in
the aspect of opinion formation are illustrated. In Sec. V, we discuss that our model can be
understood in the Bayesian viewpoint. A few remarks are finally added in Sec. VI.
II. MODEL
We consider a poll where the voter has two options, A or B. The poll score is counted
per each vote, and is open to the public. Now suppose a voter who prefers A is about to poll
while knowing that the option A scores n out of the previous t votes. We here assume that
the voter partially complies with the group opinion n/t representing the average preference
of the previous voters to the option A. This consideration weakens the voter’s preference to
A. In order to model this feature stochastically, we introduce a probability σ between n/t
and 1, with which the voter votes for A. With the complementary probability 1 − σ, the
voter votes for B instead.
To be specific, we suggest an interpolation between n/t and 1 for the probability σ:
σ(n, t, k) =
t× (n/t) + k × 1
t+ k
=
n+ k
t+ k
, (1)
where the weighting factor t is motivated by the number of the previous voters giving n/t
and the other weighting factor k represents a degree of the self-assurance of the voter’s own
preference. As k represents the self-assurance, k > 0 is assumed.
It is instructive to see a few extreme cases of Eq. (1). If k → ∞ or if n = t, which
corresponds to either the case when the voter has definite preference undisturbed or the case
when the group opinion unanimously coincides with the voter’s preference, the probability
becomes maximized as σ = 1. In the absence of previous poll results (t = 0 and hence
n = 0), voters also vote for their preferences with probability, σ = 1. If k ≈ 0, which is the
case that the voter has little confidence about the preference, σ is almost given by the group
opinion n/t collected up to then.
Recall here that σ given in Eq. (1) is for a voter whose preference is A. If the preference
of a voter is B, the voter votes for the option B with a probability σ(t−n, t, k). We remark
that no individual-dependence is considered in k, for simplicity and tractability. Thus k also
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represents a collective property of the population.
III. POLL-SCORE DISTRIBUTION
Suppose that f and 1 − f fractions of the total population have the preference A and
B, respectively, and assume that individuals vote sequentially in random order. Then,
according to the voting rule suggested above, the probability that the poll score of the
option A increases by a voter is given by
pA(t, n) ≡ fσ(n, t, k) + (1− f)[1− σ(t− n, t, k)]
=
n+ kf
t+ k
. (2)
The first and the second term are the increments made respectively by a voter having
preference A and a voter who has the preference B but votes for A. Similar consideration
leads to the probability that the poll score of the option B increases by a voter,
pB(t, n) ≡ f [1− σ(n, t, k)] + (1− f)σ(t− n, t, k)
= 1− pA(t, n) . (3)
This is same as the probability that the poll score of the option A remains unchanged.
Calculation relevant to our interest can proceed more transparently with a notation |t, n〉,
representing the poll state of score n of option A after t votes, and two linear operators Aˆ
and Bˆ, defined as
Aˆ |t, n〉 = pA(t, n) |t+ 1, n+ 1〉 (4)
Bˆ |t, n〉 = pB(t, n) |t+ 1, n〉 . (5)
The Aˆ operation on |t, n〉 increases both the total vote number and the score for A by one
and gives the probability pA as the proportional coefficient. The Bˆ operation increases only
the total vote number, and the resulting state |t+ 1, n〉 is multiplied by the coefficient, pB,
the probability of its occurrence. Adding Eqs. (4) and (5), we have Vˆ ≡ (Aˆ+ Bˆ) acting on
|t, n〉 to yield
Vˆ |t, n〉 = pA(t, n) |t+ 1, n+ 1〉+ pB(t, n) |t+ 1, n〉 , (6)
which is a useful formula in the probabilistic description of the voting result. For example,
Vˆ 2 |t, n〉 is given by a linear combination of |t + 2, n〉 , |t+ 2, n+ 1〉, and |t+ 2, n+ 2〉, of
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which each coefficient is the probability for the multiplied poll state to appear. In this way,
repeated application of Vˆ leads to all possible poll states with their own probabilities.
Let |t0, n0〉 with integer t0 ≥ n0 ≥ 0 be the initial condition of the poll. We do not impose
t0 = 0 to emulate a possible initial guide (or bias) by a few experts’ opinion or pre-poll voting
on the issue, for example. All possible poll states that occur after t votes can be generated
by applying Vˆ t times to the initial state |t0, n0〉 as
Vˆ t |t0, n0〉 =
t∑
n=0
P (t, n) |t0 + t, n0 + n〉 . (7)
Here P (t, n) is the probability that the option A acquires n votes from t voters, which is the
central quantity of our interest.
In deriving P (t, n), we first check whether one can use the binomial expansion for Vˆ t =
(Aˆ+ Bˆ)t or not. For an arbitrary |t, n〉, using Eqs. (4) and (5), we compare
AˆBˆ |t, n〉 = pB(t, n)Aˆ|t+ 1, n〉
= pB(t, n)pA(t+ 1, n)|t+ 2, n+ 1〉 (8)
with
BˆAˆ |t, n〉 = pA(t, n)Bˆ |t+ 1, n+ 1〉
= pA(t, n)pB(t + 1, n+ 1) |t+ 2, n+ 1〉 . (9)
Here, one may use Eqs. (2) and (3) to find
pB(t, n)pA(t+ 1, n) = pA(t, n)pB(t+ 1, n+ 1) =
(n+ kf)(t− n+ k(1− f))
(t+ k)(t+ 1 + k)
. (10)
Equation (10) shows that Aˆ and Bˆ commute with each other since we consider an arbitrary
|t, n〉. Thus, regardless of the past, the probability of a vote for A and then for B is equal
to the probability of a vote for B and then for A. Hence, the binomial expansion,
Vˆ t =
t∑
n=0
t!
(t− n)!n!
Bˆt−nAˆn , (11)
can be utilized. Introducing c(t, n) as Bˆt−nAˆn |t0, n0〉 = c(t, n) |t0, n0〉, we write
P (t, n) =
t!
(t− n)!n!
c(t, n) (12)
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and obtain c(t, n) through repeated application of Eqs. (4) and (5). A little algebra leads to
c(t, n) =
t−n∏
j=1
t0 + j − 1− n0 + k(1− f)
t0 + n+ j − 1 + k
n∏
j=1
n0 + j − 1 + kf
t0 + j − 1 + k
=
Γ(t0 + t− n− n0 + k(1− f))Γ(t0 + n + k)
Γ(t0 − n0 + k(1− f))Γ(t0 + t + k)
×
Γ(n0 + n + kf)Γ(t0 + k)
Γ(n0 + kf)Γ(t0 + n+ k)
, (13)
where Γ(z) is the gamma function [16], and its property Γ(z + 1) = zΓ(z) is used to obtain
the second equality. Inserting Eq. (13) into Eq. (12) and rearranging terms, we reach
P (t, n) =
Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
g(t, 1, t0 + k)g(n, α, 1)g(t− n, β, 1) , (14)
where the parameters α and β are defined as
α = n0 + kf and β = t0 − n0 + k(1− f), (15)
and g(z, a, b) is the ratio of two gamma functions: g(z, a, b) = Γ(z + a)/Γ(z + b).
Because in most of the poll performed the number of votes is usually large, it is more
meaningful to find the behavior of P (t, n) for t ≫ 1. Moreover, unless either of the option
A and the option B is absolutely supported such that n ∼ O(1) and t − n ∼ O(1), which
is actually the case of polling on a subtle and controversial issue, n and t − n can also be
assumed large numbers. Under this considerations, using that the gamma function ratio
follows an asymptotic behavior, g(z, a, b) ≈ za−b for relatively large z [16], we find that final
voting results are well characterized by
P (t, n) ≈
Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
t1−t0−knα−1(t− n)β−1 . (16)
With r ≡ n/t, the right hand side of Eq. (16) is rewritten as (1
t
) Γ(α+β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
rα−1(1−r)β−1. In the
large t limit, r becomes continuous and the infinitesimal quantity dr = dn/t = 1/t appears.
Therefore, one may read the probability density function
p(r) =
Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
rα−1(1− r)β−1 (17)
on 0 < r < 1, which satisfies
∫ n2/t
n1/t
drp(r) =
∑n2
n=n1
P (t, n) for any n1 and n2 in the large t
limit. Interestingly, p(r) is the well-known beta distribution [17], of which shape parameters
α and β are given by Eq. (15). The various statistical properties of r are therefore available
from what is already known for the beta distribution.
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Finishing this section, we add two remarks. The validity of p(r) [Eq. (17)] is restricted
when one of α and β vanishes. In this case, the beta distribution is ill-defined because of
Γ(0). Instead, the limiting behavior of p(r) is compatible with the model result, as follows.
α(= n0 + kf) = 0 appears if f = n0 = 0. In this situation, Eqs. (2) and (3) shows that
the score of B always increases to give P (t, 0) = 1 for all t. This observation is compatible
with the associated limiting behavior, limα→0 p(r) = δ(r), in that
∫ ǫ
0
drδ(r) = 1 for any
fixed ǫ > 0. That is, α = 0 case can be still understood with p(r) in the α → 0 limit.
Similarly, β(= t0 − n0 + k(1 − f)) = 0 by f = 1 and n0 = t0 trivially gives P (t, t) = 1
that is understandable with limβ→0 p(r) = δ(r − 1). In our model, α = β = 0 is not the
case because k > 0. We also remark that our model can be viewed as a generalization of
the Po´lya’s urn [18] well-known in statistics community. Our model gives the Po´lya’s urn
process when t0 = 0 case is excluded and the self-assurance part is removed with k = 0.
IV. PUBLIC OPINION PROPERTY
Now we discuss the behaviors of the poll score distribution, p(r), given as Eq. (17), and
how the poll results reflect the preference of the population. The average of r and its variance
are, respectively, given by
〈r〉 =
α
α + β
=
t0ρ0 + kf
t0 + k
(18)
and
〈δr2〉 =
αβ
(α + β)2(α + β + 1)
=
〈r〉(1− 〈r〉)
t0 + k + 1
, (19)
where ρ0 ≡ n0/t0 and δr
2 ≡ (r − 〈r〉)2. Note that the average 〈r〉 is not necessarily f
and is given by the interpolation between ρ0 and f with weights t0 and k, respectively. As
a result, a finite initial score of t0 and n0 can make the average of poll results different
from f representing the preference of the population. Moreover, the variance remains finite
even though 〈r〉 is the average of the infinite number of bounded random variables. These
observations are attributed to the fact that the score increment in each vote is not an
independent and identically distributed random variable but rather depends on the poll
score up to then [see Eq. (2)]. In addition, the variance decreases for t0, which implies the
poll result could be controlled in an efficient way by increasing t0. A more detailed discussion
will follow.
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FIG. 1. (a) The probability density function p(r) [Eq. (17)] when f = 0.6 and t0 = 0 with
k = 1 (solid), 2 (dashed), 5 (dotted) respectively. (b) The distortion probability d(p) (see text)
when f = 0.6 and t0 = 0 with k = 0.2/1/2/10, respectively, from top to bottom. (c) p(r) with
f = 0.6, k = t0 = 1, n0 = 0 (solid) and t0 = 10, n0 = 0/3, f = 1, k = 5 (dashed/dotted). (d) D as a
function of f with t0 = 10, n0 = 0/3, k = 5 (solid/dashed).
Let us first consider the case of t0 = 0, i.e. with no initial bias. One of the interesting
features of the beta distribution is that, when the shape parameters, α and β, are smaller
than 1, the distribution shows singular peaks at the boundaries, r = 0 and r = 1, while
the average lies between the two peaks [the solid curve in Fig. 1(a)]. The two peaks at the
boundaries indicate that either of the extreme poll results is likely. The condition of α, β < 1
basically requires t0 = 0, and thus it is equivalent to k < 1/max(f, 1− f): the boundedness
of k as small value suggests such an extreme poll result can be expected in a society of weak
self-assurance. Note that the two peaks do imply not a polarization of the public opinion
but a probabilistic bifurcation (or herding) by random voting scores at early stages.
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As k increases to hold 1/max(f, 1− f) < k < 1/min(f, 1− f), α > 1 and β < 1 follows
when f > 1/2 or, otherwise, α < 1 and β > 1 when f < 1/2. Then one of the peaks
disappears [the dashed curve in Fig. 1(a)]. Increasing k further up to k > 1/min(f, 1 − f),
the remaining peak also disappears to give a centered distribution whose maximum is in
0 < r < 1 [the dotted curve in Fig. 1(a)]. This way, the tendency of herding to the
extreme(s) is weakened as k, a self-assurance, increases. In any cases with t0 = 0, 〈r〉 = f
[Eq. (18)] implies the poll results capture the population preference, on average. However,
since the variance remains finite even in the infinite population limit [Eq. (19)], it is likely
that the statistical properties of the poll results are ill-represented by the average alone. A
poll result of large deviation from the population preference will not be rare even though
the population is infinite.
Suppose, for instance, that an issue is determined by the majority rule with poll result.
Then there is a non-zero probability of distortion in a sense that the issue will be settled
with a final decision opposite to the major preference of the population. For f > 1/2, the
distortion probability is measured as D =
∫ 1/2
0
dr p(r), the area of p(r) below r = 1/2,
while for f < 1/2, it is given by the area above. In Fig. 1(b), we show the distortion
probability D as a function of f for various k, which monotonically decreases from 1/2 to
0 as the population preference f increases. For a given f , D becomes larger for smaller k
and approaches 1 − f as p(r) → fδ(r) + (1 − f)δ(r − 1) in the k → 0 limit when t0 = 0.
This indicates the distorted decision is reached with higher probability in a society of weak
self-assurance.
We next consider the initial bias (or intervene) case of t0 ≥ 1 in which the average is not
kept f unless ρ0 = f . This may result in the various distortion depending on the choice
of t0 and n0. For example, if t0 ≥ 1 and n0 = 0 are considered, the same f and k used in
Fig. 1(a) give the shape parameters, α < 1 and β > 1 [Eq. (15)], leading to a distribution
peaked at r = 0 [the solid curve in Fig. 1(c)]. An interesting point here is that the distortion
probability can be greater than 1/2: it is more probable that the poll results indicate the
opposite to the preference of the population. We below call such a dominant occurrence of
the distortion as the reversal. The reversal can take place in various ways depending on the
combination of t0, n0, f , and k. The dashed curve in Fig. 1(c) is another example of the
reversal while the dotted one therein is not. Then, a rising question is when the reversal
occurs.
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The condition in which the reversal occurs corresponds to D > 1/2. Observing Eqs. (17)
and (15), one finds that the side of major distribution with respect to r = 1/2 changes
depending upon which of α and β is larger. In order for the reversal to occur, α < β is
therefore required when f > 1/2, and this results in
t0
(
1− 2ρ0
2f − 1
)
> k . (20)
The criterion is also given in the same form for the case of f < 1/2. One easily checks that
each set of t0, n0, p, and k of the solid/dashed curves in Fig. 1(c) fulfills Eq. (20) while that
of the dotted curve does not.
Equation (20) shows that only a finite t0 can bring about the reversal even if the infinite
population size is considered. This is still the case even for a population with full consensus
(f = 1) only if t0 > k/(1 − 2ρ0). When ρ0 = 0, any finite t0 > k leads to the reversal, no
matter how strong the consensus is. These indicate that with t0 and n0 implanted, probing
the population preference through a poll can be unreliable. The solid curve of Fig. 1(d) shows
a distortion probability where the reversal occurs even for f = 1 when t0 = 10, n0 = 0, and
k = 5. The distortion probability at f = 1 is the distribution area of the dashed curve of
Fig. 1(c) below r = 1/2, and it is 0.91022(3). Its complementary probability, the area of
the other side, decays exponentially fast as t0 increases. Note this is the probability that the
population of full consensus of f = 1 will win in the poll by the majority rule. The dashed
curve in Fig. 1(c) shows the reversal is not the case after f = 0.9 when n0 = 3 is instead
used.
V. BAYESIAN INTERPRETATION
We discuss that our model [Eq. (1)] can be interpreted in a Bayesian viewpoint [19], as
follows. Let vi = 0 or 1 be the voting score of A by i-th voter. From the commutativity
property AˆBˆ = BˆAˆ [see Eqs. (8), (9), and (10)], it follows that
p(v1, v2, .., vt) = p(vπ(1), vπ(2), ..vπ(t)) , (21)
where p(v1, v2, .., vt) is the joint distribution for any t and π is an arbitrary permutation.
Then, by the de Finetti’s theorem [20] for the representation of such exchangeable random
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variable vis, one can write
p(Vt) =
∫
dθθn(1− θ)t−nF (θ) , (22)
where Vt ≡ (v1, v2, .., vt), n =
∑t
i=1 vi, and F (θ) is a distribution on 0 < θ < 1.
Dividing both sides of Eq. (22) with p(Vt), one obtains
pF (θ|Vt) ≡
1
p(Vt)
θn(1− θ)t−nF (θ) , (23)
which is trivially normalized for the integration with respect to θ. Here, one may regard
θn(1 − θ)t−n as the likelihood for the observation Vt, out of t independent Bernoulli trials
with probability θ for 1 in each. Then, F (θ) becomes the weight of the likelihood, which is
referred to the prior belief (on the distribution of θ) in Bayesian approach [19, 21]. These
observations illuminates that Eq. (23), basically a rewrriting of Eq. (22), is the Bayesian
inference on the latent variable θ. That is, pF (θ|Vt) is the conditional probability density of
θ, provided the observation Vt, from the aspect of an individual with her/his own F (θ).
If she/he preferring A votes for the first time, Eq. (22) gives p(V1 = v1 = 1) =∫
dθθF (θ) = 1 in that the first voter follows one’s own preference. Thus, the prior be-
lief of the voter preferring A should be characterized by F (θ) → δ(θ − 1). A realization of
such F (θ) may read with κ, ǫ > 0
F (θ) =
θκ−1(1− θ)ǫ−1
B(κ, ǫ)
, (24)
where ǫ approaches 0 later and B(x, y) = Γ(x)Γ(y)/Γ(x+y) is for normalization. In Eq. (24),
we use a beta distribution to keep the conjugate pair [21, 22] between the prior F (θ) and
the posterior pF (θ|Vt), as usual in the Bayesian studies.
When the average of θ is taken for pF (θ|Vt), Eqs. (22), (23), and (24) gives
E(θ) ≡
∫
dθθpF (θ|Vt) =
p(Vt, vt+1 = 1)
p(Vt)
= lim
ǫ→0
B(n + 1 + κ, t− n + ǫ)
B(n+ κ, t− n+ ǫ)
=
n + κ
t+ κ
. (25)
Therein, p(Vt, vt+1 = 1)/p(Vt) points out E(θ) is the probability that the score of A increases
in the (t + 1)-th vote, provided Vt. This is the expectation of an individual preferring A
since the used F (θ) is Eq. (24).
Interestingly, E(θ) of Eq. (25) is same as σ(t, n, k) of Eq. (1) with κ = k. This is the case
when F (θ) of our model [Eq. (1)] that necessarily gives P (V1 = v1 = 1) =
∫
θF (θ)dθ = 1 is
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attributed to the form of Eq. (24). This observation suggests that the probability of Eq. (1),
with which the voter votes for the preferred option, can be understood as the Bayesian
expectation on the scoring rate of Eq. (25). In this sense, the voter of our model supports
one’s own preference only as much as she/he expects in the Bayesian viewpoint.
VI. REMARKS
The model parameter k might not be easily quantified and, by its nature, it lies in
psychology realm. As k plays the important role in interpreting the results of our model, it is
meaningful to estimate its magnitude. A few psychological experiments [23] are noteworthy
here; perhaps the conformity experiment by Asch is the celebrated example. It was observed
that an experiment participant could not defy the wrong answer by a group of agreed people
(fewer than ten), even when asked a question without ambiguity such as to identify two lines
of the same length. This experiment suggests that self-assurance could be, in fact, not so
solid and k in our model may not exceed 10.
As demonstrated already, the effect of the initial intervene (or bias) with t0 ≥ 1 is
significant in the statistics of the poll scores. It effectively controls the average [Eq. (18)] and
also the variance [Eq. (19)], and furthermore plays an efficient role in hiding the preference
of the population [Eq. (20)]. Here, it is informative to note that the effect is basically a
consequence of the competition between t0 and k, and that k is estimated not to exceed 10 in
the previous paragraph. In this regards, it seems plausible that the release of the preliminary
voting score may result in a so-called public opinion manipulation and/or fabrication. This
is accordant with the claim/observation that an announcement of the election score or
atmosphere in the early stage may have a considerable impact on the final result [24, 25].
The fake-news propagation can also be understood in our model with an inappropriate initial
bias which intends to distort a fact.
Apparently, the real voting behavior is much more complicated than that we have con-
sidered in this work. Our model has a considerable room for improvement, for example,
including the individual difference of k or implementing other voting rules depending on is-
sues. Nonetheless, we believe, the message of our present model study that the prior-opinion
bias can drive the poll result against the population preference should be considered as a
reflection of reality to some degree, for nowadays the opinion formation through many web-
12
based surveys with polling or recommendation scores becomes more frequent and influential.
We anticipate that these scores that might include a fabricated count is getting influential
in forming public opinion as there appears too much (so-called) information on online for
individuals to discern.
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